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Scholars are accustomed to thinking about family privacy in terms 
of geometry.  The allocation of public and private power in domestic 
life is classically diagramed as a triangle, representing the separate in-
terests of parent, child, and the state.  Parental prerogative in raising 
children, on one leg of the triangle, is offset by another leg represent-
ing the state’s parens patriae power to ensure the basic welfare of chil-
dren and their development into productive citizens. 
In Between Home and School, Laura Rosenbury intriguingly contends 
that this geometry obscures a broader and important geography of fam-
ily privacy.
1
  Family law, she argues, tends to relate questions of author-
ity over childrearing to the locations in which it occurs.  At home, par-
ents rule the roost; their authority within the sanctity of the home is 
protected by a robust constitutional doctrine of parental rights that 
gives way to state control only in cases of abuse or neglect.  At school, 
by contrast, state officials call the shots and parents have no real 
grounds to object.
2
  A fundamental shortcoming of this binary doc-
trine, she contends, is that it makes no provision for a great deal of 
childrearing that takes place in locations other than home and 
school—in summer camps, church groups, social organizations, day 
care centers, and so on.
3
  Professor Rosenbury points out that the so-
cialization of children that occurs in these “between” locations is sig-
nificant, both for children and for society, and she calls for a clearer 
articulation of the legal principles respecting childrearing authority in 
these spaces.
4
 
If Professor Rosenbury’s article went no further than this, it would 
have made a distinctly valuable contribution by calling attention to the 
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lack of scholarship addressing the childrearing that takes place in 
these often-influential spaces.  Other scholars have begun to address 
this shortcoming, importantly taking account of the socializing impact 
of mass media and similar “environmental” influences on children,
5
 
but Professor Rosenbury makes a strong case that a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the distinctive role of “in between” childrearing 
is needed. 
Professor Rosenbury’s article then goes on to lay the foundation 
for such an understanding by suggesting the outlines of a distinctive 
normative approach for addressing the socialization of children be-
tween home and school.  In exploring the appropriate governing 
principles, Professor Rosenbury first considers whether the “between” 
spaces might be analogized to either home or school, such that the 
model of preeminent parental or state authority in those respective 
spheres might simply be extended to cover the gaps.  She acknowl-
edges, for example, that “[f]amily law’s current silence about . . . 
childrearing [between home and school] could reflect, by default, a 
normative view of parental control over children in all spaces but 
school.”
6
  Alternatively, “[a]nother approach is to view childrearing 
between home and school as an extension of school, confining paren-
tal prerogatives (and those of their surrogates) to the privacy of the 
home.”
7
 
She concludes, however, that neither analogy is quite right.  The 
childrearing that occurs in “between” spaces, often under the direc-
tion of actors who are neither parents nor teachers, is different from 
in-home care in that it may expose children to values distinct from 
those inculcated by their parents.  Moreover, because of the diverse 
nature of the childrearing influences in these spaces, it is also valuably 
different from the more standardized tutelage children are likely to 
receive at school.
8
  Accordingly, “the spaces between home and school 
may be distinct from both home and school,”
9
 occupying a sort of no 
man’s land in which neither parental nor state control should totally 
dominate.  Parents may rule the home and the state may rule the 
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school; in between, however, childrearing authority should be shared 
by parents, the state, and third parties (e.g., camps, youth groups, and 
other entities) that undertake to influence the upbringing of children 
in their care.  Under this schema, third-party childcare operators 
would be largely free to follow their own methods of raising children; 
parents would be free to enroll or withdraw their children from these 
programs as they saw fit; and the state would be permitted to intervene 
(apart from cases of abuse or neglect) for one purpose only:  to en-
sure that third-party actors respect broad values of diversity and plural-
ism in raising children.
10
 
Professor Rosenbury’s exploration of the relevance of place in allo-
cating public and private power over childrearing is both ambitious 
and important.  She is undoubtedly correct that parental authority is 
maximal within the privacy of the home and that state educational in-
terests generally overwhelm the preferences of individual parents at 
school.  She is also right to call for greater attention to the principles 
that should govern childrearing outside of home and school, and to 
ask whether actors other than parents or guardians might be entitled 
to some measure of constitutional protection for their childrearing ac-
tivities.  In a world where children are spending more time in the care 
of out-of-home caregivers, and where third-party actors (especially 
through mass media) are displacing both parents and schools as the 
dominant socializing influence on children,
11
 these are important mat-
ters. 
Professor Rosenbury’s analysis is insightful and entirely plausible, 
and provokes, for me, two overriding questions: 
(1) To what extent is the allocation of childrearing authority properly 
determined by the location in which it occurs? 
(2) To what extent, if any, should third parties—non-parent actors out-
side the family—be entitled to assert “privacy” rights to rear other peo-
ple’s children? 
First, in assessing the significance of place in defining childrearing 
authority, it bears noting that the space between home and school is 
not entirely terra nova for family privacy.  Prince v. Massachusetts, for 
one, involved a dispute over childrearing between home and school—
specifically, whether a guardian was constitutionally entitled to enlist 
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her nine-year-old niece in proselytizing on a public street corner.
12
  
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the state’s power to intervene, 
but in doing so plainly accepted that parents’ rights under the Consti-
tution extended to the street corner.  Although Sarah Prince stood on 
a Brockton sidewalk and not in her living room, the Court did not 
doubt that she remained within the constitutionally protected “private 
realm of family life.”
13
  She lost only because, under the circumstances 
of the case, her conceded parental rights were overcome by a more 
powerful state interest—protecting children from the potential detri-
ments of child labor and “the diverse influences of the street.”
14
  Even 
Meyer v. Nebraska
15
 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
16
 the foundational fam-
ily privacy decisions upholding the right of parents to educate their 
children in private schools, can be seen as effectively recognizing that 
parents’ childrearing rights extend beyond the home. 
Prince saw the street corner dispute as involving a “clash” of paren-
tal and state powers which required a “delicate” accommodation in 
“the no man’s land where this battle has gone on.”
17
  But the “no 
man’s land” that the Court had in mind was surely conceptual rather 
than physical or geographic.  Indeed, the same clash of powerful pa-
rental and state interests occurs at home and at school, as well as the 
spaces in between.  The state can sometimes reach inside the home to 
override parents’ childrearing decisions, even in the absence of child 
abuse or neglect.  Troxel v. Granville, for example, affirmed the power 
of courts, in properly limited cases, to compel parents to make their 
children available for visitation with persons outside the household.
18
  
In doing so, the Court declined to limit the state’s power to cases 
where the loss of contact would cause “serious harm” to a child (the 
standard used by the state court below), and instead directed only that 
courts should give “special weight” to parents’ concerns in assessing 
whether nonparental visitation is in a child’s best interest.
19
  In similar 
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fashion, the state may reach inside the home to compel parents to 
vaccinate their children (even when the risks to children from forgo-
ing the vaccination are not so great as to constitute medical neglect)
20
 
and, as Professor Rosenbury acknowledges, may superintend the 
pedagogical or curricular choices of a home-schooling parent.
21
 
By the same token, the clash between parental prerogative and the 
state’s interest in a child’s well-being can be found at school as well.  
True, a number of state and lower federal court decisions have 
dodged parents’ constitutional complaints about school policies on 
the ground that parents have no particularized right to control cur-
ricula or otherwise “micro-manage” the schools.
22
  Others, however, 
have recognized that parents’ fundamental interest in the upbringing 
of their children does not vanish at the schoolhouse door, and have 
gone on to evaluate school policies on the merits—balancing parental 
objections against pedagogical or other interests asserted by the 
state.
23
  Runyon v. McCrary,
24
 which refused to exempt private, segre-
gated schools from federal laws banning race discrimination, illus-
trates the second approach.  The Court readily acknowledged that 
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while state control of private school admissions “does not represent 
governmental intrusion into the privacy of the home or a similarly in-
timate setting, it does implicate parental interests” rooted in the con-
stitutional right of privacy.
25
  The state’s imposition was nevertheless 
justified because it was “reasonable.”
26
 
Professor Rosenbury surveys the landscape of family privacy and 
sees three distinct territories:  home, school, and in between.  She 
proposes to embrace the location of childrearing as a basic organizing 
principle for family privacy analysis, employing different legal stan-
dards to assess claims of childrearing autonomy in each of the three 
territories.  Basically ceding the home to parents and schools to the 
state, she proposes a special rule for the distinctive space in between 
in order to balance the legitimate private and public interests at play 
there.  My own inclination is to focus on the essential similarities con-
necting all three categories, and to emphasize that, in all locations, re-
solving family privacy disputes inevitably requires balancing the liber-
ties of family members against the interests of the state in protecting 
children from harm and ensuring their healthy development.  Rather 
than set out distinctive legal standards for each childrearing space, a 
single balancing framework might accomplish the same task with 
greater sensitivity to the endlessly variable exigencies that may arise. 
Location clearly should matter to this balancing.  The state might 
have stronger justifications for restricting certain childrearing prac-
tices in public places (say, family nudism, to borrow from one of Pro-
fessor Rosenbury’s illustrative cases,
27
 or the infliction of corporal pun-
ishment) than it would have if the practices were confined entirely 
within the home.  Certainly, constitutional doctrine has long recog-
nized an extra measure of privacy protection for the home.  Lawrence 
v. Texas, for example, observed that constitutional privacy (or “lib-
erty,” as Lawrence prefers) has both decisional and “spatial” dimen-
sions, with added protection for the “dwelling or other private 
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26
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tional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered 
by reasonable government regulation. 
Id.  
27
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2007]                THE GEOGRAPHY OF FAMILY PRIVACY                         142 
places.”
28
  By the same token, Prince held that “[t]he state’s authority 
over children’s activities” is enlarged when the conduct occurs “in 
public places.”
29
 
Location is relevant to the measure of parental rights for several 
reasons.  Professor Rosenbury cogently points out that location mat-
ters to children because the guidance they receive in “between” places 
from community members may be different from the tutelage they re-
ceive at home or school and is therefore uniquely beneficial.  In addi-
tion, location surely matters to parents because the intrusion they feel 
will be far greater when they are told how to behave in their own 
home than elsewhere.  And location matters to the state because the as-
sertion of parental prerogative outside the home may impose signifi-
cant externalities.  This, in fact, seems to be the primary concern driv-
ing courts to reject parental attempts to control school curricula or 
other policies:  accommodating the idiosyncratic preferences of indi-
vidual parents may well diminish the educational experience of other 
children and financially burden school districts.
30
 
Each of these considerations counsels taking account of place—
any assessment of the constitutionality of state regulation of childrear-
ing must weigh the burden on parents and children against the public 
costs and benefits—but how exactly?  Professor Rosenbury’s frame-
work would fix the bar differently for home, school, and in between.  
She appears to accept that childrearing within the home should be 
subject to intervention only in cases of abuse or neglect,
31
 and that 
state control over childrearing in the public schools is essentially un-
fettered by parental rights.
32
  In between, Professor Rosenbury would 
permit the state to regulate childrearing only to enhance children’s 
exposure to diverse values and ways of life.  Under this standard, the 
state could compel the Boy Scouts, for example, to admit gay scout-
masters (furthering pluralism), but could not require parents or 
guardians to accompany their children to nudist youth camps (since 
the requirement would do nothing to enhance pluralism).
33
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Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005). 
31
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32
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33
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This stratified approach could bring greater predictability to fam-
ily privacy analysis, but would do so by limiting the considerations that 
otherwise might inform the necessary balancing.  Whether the gain 
would be worth its costs is uncertain.  It seems to me, for example, 
that enhancing children’s exposure to diversity is not the only public 
interest that might properly justify state regulation of childrearing be-
tween home and school.  I am not convinced, for example, that the 
state’s ability to impose modest regulations intended to ensure the 
safety of children participating in a back-country wilderness program, 
or to reduce the danger of sexual imposition at a nudist camp for ado-
lescents, should depend on proof that the hazards would otherwise 
constitute abuse or neglect.  Likewise, regulatory burdens in the pur-
suit of pluralism should be justified by some demonstration that the 
benefits to children will in fact be substantial.  If childrearing outside 
the home genuinely deserves significant constitutional protection, as it 
surely does, then we should insist on assurances that the public benefit 
truly outweighs the impositions on private choice.  If applied rigidly, a 
categorical and exclusive allowance for state regulation mandating in-
clusiveness or pluralism in out-of-home childrearing might allow at 
once too little state intervention (barring safety-oriented regulations 
absent hazards amounting to neglect) and too much (permitting all 
inclusion-oriented regulation without a demonstration of its substan-
tial benefits). 
Alternatively, location could be used not as an organizing princi-
ple, but as a more indeterminate factor in calibrating the strength of 
justification required of the state for any intervention in childrearing.  
Courts might continue to demand more compelling justification for 
state supervision of childrearing in the home, while gradually relaxing 
their expectations as the location of the regulated activity shifts to 
ever-more public places.
34
  In this way, location could take its place 
alongside other factors traditionally considered by the courts when de-
termining the appropriate level of scrutiny in family-privacy controver-
sies—such as the degree and quality of the state’s imposition, the de-
gree to which affected family members are united or divided in 
opposing the state’s intervention, and the traditionality or novelty of 
 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 
F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
34
Cf. Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 874 (acknowledging that “when the childrearing 
traditionally performed within the home moves to organizations outside of the home, 
it is conceivable that the privacy accorded to such childrearing should gradually give 
way to state interests”). 
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the regulation.
35
 
Those who are distrustful of the ability or willingness of courts to 
apply such balancing tests with sensitivity and restraint may well prefer 
Professor Rosenbury’s proposed approach.  One could reasonably fear 
that the indeterminacy of multi-factor balancing will lead too many 
judges to undervalue privacy, especially the privacy of families whose 
methods of childrearing do not conform to prevailing social conven-
tions.
36
  From that vantage point, cabining the judicial role through 
the crisper lines suggested by Professor Rosenbury—including the 
privileged place given to the state’s pursuit of pluralistic values in 
childrearing between home and school—may appear to strike exactly 
the right balance. 
The second major question Professor Rosenbury’s article raises 
concerns the rights-holding status given to third-party actors who en-
gage in childrearing.  Professor Rosenbury posits that third parties 
who socialize children (including entities such as the Boy Scouts and 
summer camps) should enjoy constitutionally protected autonomy “to 
engage in the childrearing of their choice, much as parents are per-
mitted—and even encouraged—to do.”
37
  This seems to imply that 
these actors should be recognized as holding family privacy rights of 
their own, a proposition sure to be controversial and yet one that co-
incides with tentative and fledgling efforts to recognize privacy rights 
in persons other than parents.  The Supreme Court in 1977 hesitated 
to recognize foster parents as holding family privacy rights in Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform.
38
  But more recently, 
in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens was prepared to recognize that 
children could potentially hold privacy rights in maintaining “familial 
or family-like bonds” with non-parents;
39
 and Justice Scalia agreed that 
a gradual extension of family-privacy rights to others outside the par-
ent-child relationship was the inevitable implication of the Court’s 
 
35
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(2001) (suggesting that privacy protection is often dependent upon conformity with 
traditional norms of family organization). 
37
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38
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39
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doctrine.
40
  It is therefore possible to imagine that third parties who 
care for children might be accorded childrearing rights.  Yet, the par-
ties who have prevailed in the lower courts so far have all been inti-
mately bound to the children in their care.  The “de facto parent” who 
assumes a parenting partnership with a legal parent surely stands in a 
different position from the Boy Scouts or the neighborhood day care 
provider. 
Could it be that private associations that engage in childrearing 
(as opposed to adult socializing or charity work, for example) are enti-
tled to an extra measure of public deference under the Constitution?  
I think that is entirely plausible, and Professor Rosenbury makes a 
substantial case that such a principle would benefit children.  At the 
same time, I think it likely that the deference would hinge ultimately 
on respect for parental preferences, not on any independent childrear-
ing role of the association. 
Several rationales undergird parental rights under the Constitu-
tion.  Respecting the childrearing liberty of individual parents pro-
motes, as Professor Rosenbury observes, pluralism in families and so-
cial values by preventing the state from seeking to “standardize” 
children according to a single ideal.
41
  But the task of pluralizing 
childrearing is entrusted to parents, as opposed to child-development 
professionals, neighbors, or other caring neutrals, for good reason.  
First, parents are presumed to be best situated to protect their chil-
dren’s welfare because of “the emotional attachments that derive from 
the intimacy of daily association.”
42
  As Emily Buss has cogently put the 
point, “Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and 
considerable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the 
child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their chil-
 
40
See id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing judicial vindication of parental 
rights).  For a full exploration, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN (2006) (analyzing children’s rights when the state makes decisions about 
their personal relationships). 
41
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Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (“[T]he means adopted [to foster a homogeneous people 
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with rights assured to plaintiff . . . .”); MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 24-33 (2005) (exploring the theoretical foundations of the Su-
preme Court’s protection of parental rights). 
42
Smith, 431 U.S. at 844. 
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dren’s best interests in most circumstances.”
43
  In addition, to the ex-
tent that substantive due process rights rest on social consensus about 
the limits of government power, social consensus has long looked to 
parents as the natural guardians of their children.  Neither of these 
rationales would provide much support for recognizing free-standing 
childrearing rights in caregivers outside the family circle.  Out-of-
home caregivers or youth groups, lacking the “intimacy of daily asso-
ciation” shared within the family, are unlikely to share the exceptional 
knowledge and motivation of parents, and social consensus has clearly 
not regarded such parties as beyond the reach of government regula-
tion. 
Although I am doubtful that third-party actors such as the Boy 
Scouts or summer camps can qualify as holders of constitutional child-
rearing rights of their own, it strikes me as quite plausible that they 
might be given third-party standing to assert the constitutional rights 
of parents in some instances.  Since Professor Rosenbury does not en-
vision that third-party childrearing rights could operate to limit the 
prerogatives of parents, standing to assert the rights of parents to en-
roll their children would likely accomplish the same result in any 
event. 
In summary, Professor Rosenbury makes a strong and thoughtful 
case that more systematic attention must be paid to the childrearing 
that takes place between home and school.  She also makes an impor-
tant start toward that goal by challenging family law and constitutional 
scholars to account for the relevance of place and third-party caregiv-
ers in the modern law of family privacy.  The debate on these ques-
tions is likely to unfold for many years to come, but it has already been 
enriched by Professor Rosenbury’s excellent and provocative article. 
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